ciency, while protests against motor traffic had sensitized urban populations to the noise nuisance. 3 About a decade earlier, Wharton's friend Henry James had marveled at her open car, specially refitted as a closed car with interior electric lights, in which he had "three weeks of really seeing" his beloved France. 4 The final engineering design of the closed car (with an all-steel body, windows, and a windshield) was one of the most complex and costly operations in the history of car technology. It took U.S. engineers, and the users looking over their shoulders and sometimes guiding them outright, about fifteen years to reconcile the new way of traveling and build a consensus of what a car was all about. The technical shift itself, from an open tourer to a sedan or limousine, was, in many ways, the most straightforward part of the process, happening in only a few years. Culturally, this transformation of the automobile was part of a general process of "cocooning": a redefinition of travelers' relationship to the environment, a process in which the senses played a crucial role. 5 Technically, it took place in one of the most innovative phases in car production and technology history, a period in which the relationship between the engineer and the user took on a new significance. 6 Closing the vehicle was a process related to the many changes in other components: during the process, car development was crucially shaped by the parallel discourse about comfort, especially its "scientification." disciplinary synthesis. 8 The form that multi-sensorial experience took in the case of the automobile was through the priority of comfort, which represented a new version of a specific U.S. car culture necessitating new user skills, such as conversing while driving and driving at higher speeds on the now rapidly expanding network of paved highways. 9 On the production side, a new type of "riding and body engineer" emerged who was responsible for designing vehicles according to the evolving properties of mobility.
This rearrangement of technical properties and cultural and social functions could not have been accomplished without special attention to the production and consumption of sound. This article will show how the study of sound critically influenced the eventual design of the car as it developed into a multi-sensorial "room on wheels," which although dominated by vision, was importantly supported by a "sound cocktail" deliberately "orchestrated" by manufacturers and users alike. After all, sound abatement and comfort enhancement have common physical roots: vibration. The article focuses on the United States, where the process was embedded in a well-documented engineering discourse about comfort, although the same process also occurred in Europe. 10 The discourse on automotive comfort occurred against a background of a more general and controversially debated tendency toward "decadence" enabled by technological progress. 11 Car mobility was in the middle of this debate, as it was a leisure pastime that, according to many contemporaries, had to be "roughened up" by auto camping, with its "soft primitivism." 12 Remarkably, the historiography of the car is as yet poorly developed when it comes to the sensory aspects of mobility, despite the call for a cultural turn by Colin Divall and George Revill some years ago. 13 In the transition toward what was deemed a comfortable car, the role of 8. Nupur Gogia, "Unpacking Corporeal Mobilities"; Deborah Lupton, "Monsters in Metal Cocoons"; Paul Rodaway, Sensuous Geographies; Constance Classen, "Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses"; Alexander Cowan and Jill Steward, eds., The  City sound synesthesized with vision and other senses, such as touch (of the wind, for instance), or the nearness of strangers when touring through the countryside or in foreign countries. This becomes apparent through a close reading of the Journal of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE Journal), which often published accounts of engineering meetings at all levels-local, regional, national.
14 In the analysis presented here special attention is given to the role of the end-user, even if the main sources allow only a glimpse of it, filtered as it is through the eyes of the engineers and producers.
The Changing "Automotive Adventure": Early Car Tourism
The closing of the auto body started at the end of a first, pioneering phase in which car culture was shaped by what I have elsewhere called an "automotive adventure"-in time (driving speeds and racing), in space (wandering without a clear goal), and in function (tinkering and negotiating poor roads). 15 When these early pioneers were joined by a wider, less technically educated middle-class user, the popular touring adventure began to be accompanied by calls for comfort. The desire for self-imposed hardship during motorized camping trips redefined the concept of comfort from earlier traditions of hotel-based holidays-a reformulation of an elite bourgeois practice into a middle-class mass practice. The automotive adventure was thus domesticated into a tamed version for the nuclear family. Sound engineering-the abatement of noise for both passengers and those on the road-formed a critical element in this domestication. 16 In this context, comfort covered all of the senses, although the term was vague enough to function as an umbrella concept that helped define U.S. car culture-as opposed to the European model, which was considered sporty and Spartan. Around 1914, cost calculations by tourists showed that it was cheaper for a family to travel by car than by train, especially when a tent and canned food where brought along. 18 The automotive tourism movement occurred within a wider context of increased road-building, the emergence of paid vacations, and a general climate that fostered the "urge to travel" at the local, state, and federal levels.
19 Nature parks and parkways with ersatz scenery were built for weekend tourism by city dwellers.
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The annual statistics of the National Park Service, founded in 1916 as a special bureau of the U.S. Department of the Interior, indicate that the automotive tourism movement was impressive. In 1928, 11 million cars (of 20 million registered) participated in summer tourism involving 44 million individuals, of whom 32 million lodged at hotels and motels and 12 million camped. Midway through the 1920s, cars overtook railroads as the main transportation to the parks, probably much earlier than they became the norm for commuting. In the nine most popular vacation regions that participated in "the business of selling scenery," only 7 percent of visitors were "home-staters." 21 In 1934, 38 million motorists visited or passed through national forests, and 13 million stayed long enough to enjoy recreation. Many of them stayed in camps, explored in their cars, or hiked on trails built by the Civilian Conservation Corps. A good example of this federal support for building recreational infrastructure is the Going-to-the-Sun Road in Glacier National Park, Montana, completed in 1933, its sole purpose being to offer a purely scenic experience.
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On the national roads, Americans en masse wished to "See America First," as the patriotic slogan of the tourist movement exhorted. 23 As a result, the lengths and speeds of automobile touring increased: lengths increased from an average of 125 miles in 1916 to 400 in 1936; and accelerating speeds became a "pernicious disease," as the tourist and recreation journal Outing explained. Around 1930, "making Although farmers, businessmen, shopkeepers, and salaried employees commuting to work are normally credited as the dominant actors in the breakthrough of automobiles, car technology evolved in a form that was specifically geared toward long-range tourism, not the day trip and the weekend excursion. Owners desired cars that served recreational, as well as utilitarian, needs, but the pleasure of the family trip seemed to dominate interwar car culture. 26 To enable travel for tourism, the technical properties of the car had to be geared toward what, in the 1930s, became known as "the affordable family car," which was conceived as being not too fast and "sober, not to say sedate."
27 Although Ford's Model T has been celebrated as the quintessential "universal car," during the 1920s new types of closed cars (including Ford's own A and V8 models) superseded the "flivver," and they became explicitly marketed toward the urban middle-class family just as other comfort-enhancing technologies were, such as the bathtub and the telephone.
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Reviewing a quarter-century's worth of SAE Journal reveals that engineers responded to seemingly isolated customer complaints communicated through automobile dealerships and, increasingly, via their ever-morepowerful sales departments, the engineers fixing a shortlist of general-function problems concerning the automobile's comfort, economy, performance, and speed. Several items on this shortlist came from customer surveys, such as the questionnaire that the National Automotive Chamber of Commerce (NACC) sent in 1922 to 20,000 car owners, of whom about 10 percent responded, regarding endurance and economy of operation foremost, followed by comfort, price, and appearance. Remarkably, speed was nearly at the bottom of the list, just before service appointments. 29 25. H. J. Struth, "American Motorists Spend $6,000 a Minute For Gas and Oil," 46. On increased winter traffic during the Great Depression, see Owen D. Gutfreund, 69, 146. 26. It is difficult to find quantitative evidence of the precise use profile of the car during this phase. This author dedicates an entire chapter to this issue in his forthcoming Atlantic Automobilism, resulting in the thesis that "pleasurable use" formed at least half of the average daily use of the automobile, probably more.
27. Alan R. Fenn, "The English Light-Car and Why" (no. 2), 212; "English Comment on the American Made Automobile."
28. Leonard P. Ayres, "Saturation-Point for Motor Cars Pushed Ahead to 27,000,000," 196.
29. J. E. Hale, "The Public's and the Car-Builders' Attitude Toward Balloon Tires," 461. The 10 percent response information is from Norman G. Shidle, "Practical Data Gathered for Use in Selling Cars," 351.
Manufacturers and engineers did not slavishly follow this wish list, however; on the contrary, they translated such items into their own view of the state of the art-for instance, when they decided "to give the public comfort and speedy transportation, even if this uses somewhat more gasoline than slower or less comfortable transportation." 30 Thus the translation process from (perceived) user preferences into finished car design was complex and nonlinear, governed by a large amount of uncertainty on the engineering side about what the public wanted. 31 As many Americans had witnessed firsthand during the war, European cars had higher standards of comfort: "Our cars come in for a great deal of criticism. They say we sit on our cars while they sit in theirs, and when you ride in their cars you agree with them. We spent 10 days in different makes of European cars. They ride remarkably 'easy.' . . . Their cars are most comfortable and they are very low." 32 But soon, U.S. automotive engineers began to distance themselves from their European counterparts (often reducing "Europe" to only the UK), just as European engineers did vis-à-vis U.S. car technology, hence setting in motion a process of mutual stereotyping that characterizes one side by defining the alterity of the other. 33 To give only one example among many: when a U.S. automotive engineer toured England, Belgium, Italy, and France in 1920, he observed that "[i]n Europe . . . the automobile is not transportation but adventure. [In America, the motorist] jumps into his four-door sedan as one boards a streetcar. . . . The European motorist demands less convenience than the American." The American motorist, he continued, wished "to ride all day in an automobile without being cramped or lamed any more than they would be in the best railroad cars." "Safety, comfort and elegance" was needed, another engineer opined. Especially on the Continent, the average motorist is "a courageous speed-hound": they let their "noisy engines" roar at 4,000 rpm "without flinching for hours," whereas the United States is "the paradise of the lazy driver." 34 The pages of SAE Journal provide ample evidence that U.S. engineers portrayed their design practices as simply responding to customer wishes, a characteristic that differentiated them in their own eyes from their European rivals. However, the engineers also had their own ideas when it came to design, consisting of at least two attributes that were not subject to discussion: production costs, and the decision to go with the gasoline engine over others. The first attribute overruled any changes more radical than incremental improvements, and the second avoided any loss of city driving due to its special requirements, such as frequent stopping and starting, slow driving with large steering angles for turning and parking, and so forth, although no one ever explicitly voiced such concerns. It appeared, therefore, that for U.S. engineers, although they stressed the idea that "we give the customer what he wants," this same customer had to be "educated" whenever he (and increasingly also she) threatened to oppose their own strongly held principles of good engineering.
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One may wonder why more early motorists did not prefer the electric vehicle if comfort was such a desirable trait. After all, electrics were considered to be noiseless, and their comfortable, upholstered interiors made them attractive for those who did not wish to engage in the automotive adventure.
36 What happened instead was that critics increasingly derided electrics as "feminine," while at the same time the electric's comfort was used by the competition to soften the gas car's so-called adventurousness. Taking over the threatening characteristics of its silent competitor (a technological version of "repressive tolerance"), producers and consumers alike co-constructed a masculine car culture in which the car was implicitly defined as adventurous to the senses, but in a civilized way. 37 From this perspective, the concept of co-construction has a double meaning. It refers to the dual construction work that professional engineers have to perform by first creating the product while at the same time defining its userfriendliness to prospective buyers. In other words, while the engineers are creating the product, they are also creating users and their opinions as well. Co-construction also refers, however, to the ways that both producers and users negotiate during and after the production process. 38 The examples below will illustrate how this process of co-construction worked. The cases of the engine, gearbox and gears, tires, and car body will make clear that comfort functioned as a guiding principle, which indeed set U.S. automotive technology apart from its European counterpart. 
Quieting Engines, Silencing Gears
The first example of the co-construction of a comfortable car was the development of highly oversized engines, so "elastic" (as automotive engineers today call it) that a driver hardly needed to shift gears and therefore could operate during most of a trip at a rather low load. Initiated by the consumers themselves because of their uneasiness with the complexities of gear-shifting, their desire to "go-anywhere-on-top" (in the highest gear) also drastically reduced the noise level. 39 The half-closed throttle in the inlet channel caused fuel consumption to rise, but this was a consequence that U.S. engineers were willing to accept for creating this sort of comfort, particularly because the country was the land of inexpensive gasoline. When engine speeds commenced rising in order to serve the growing longrange tourism trade and the need of frequent gear-shifting threatened the automobile's use in cities, the U.S. automotive industry developed an elaborate and costly automatic transmission to relieve drivers of this "uncomfortable" task. 40 Noise generated by the internal combustion engine was a delicate issue. One engineer estimated that duplicating the quiet drive of the electric vehicle in gasoline-powered cars consumed half of the engineers' time, noting that "[o]ur goal, as engineers designing an automobile engine, is to create power plants that shall not be heard during operation and are free from vibrations."
41 Contrary to what was happening at the same time in Europe, where tax laws forced manufacturers to build high-revving "sporting" engines, U.S. automotive engineers viewed their own engines as "faithful servants which shall sink their identity and not be in evidence at any time." 42 Soon, the struggle against noise expanded to the entire vehicle, especially the elusive howling of gear wheels-"the clutch and transmission jazz," as one engineer called them. 43 Although advertisements in European trade journals reveal a similar discourse, as early as 1925, U.S. specialists from Bell Laboratories attended SAE meetings to explain the intricacies of noise production and measurement, while engineers and scientists commenced basic applied research to lay the groundwork for a new engineering approach toward vibrations and resonance. This occurred as part of a general trend toward a more scientific approach to automotive engineering, which became all the more necessary once engineers realized that, as 48. Tore Franzen, "European Roads and American Cars," 82; Alex Taub, "Powerplant Economics," 723; Theodore M. Prudden, "Noise Treatment in the Automobile," 267; Raymond W. Smilor, "Cacophony at 34th and 6th," 26; "Noise-Engines-Springing at Car Sessions," 37A.
"chassis engineers," they had created an engine on wheels, whereas constructing a high-speed automobile required close attention to the complex dynamics of wheels, tires, steering, and braking. 44 This inspiration came from aeronautics, where scientific methods had been established much earlier. 45 One consulting engineer analyzed the "[f]our general characteristic sounds" produced by gears-intermittent clicking, irregular growl, pulsating growl (or "run-out sound"), and high-pitched squeal-and pleaded for creating "harmonious sounds," while another frankly opined, "[t]he time is here to design a car with a tuning fork."
46 Indeed, the "snapping sounds," "slapping impacts," and "oil swishes" in the transmission and the squeaking brakes were now addressed in three ways: by more precise engineering that eliminated production variations; by sound absorption, if the first solution was not effective enough; and, preferably, by changing the sound. For this, the engineer not only had to develop a scientific approach, but also something of an artistic one as well. The transmission was now compared to a "violin body" and the engineering focused on "sound"-not noise, which engineers increasingly defined as "unwanted sound." 47 Although the engineers knew that the demand for silence existed especially in the luxury automobile segment-some claiming that "[n]oise is and should be inversely proportional to price class"-by the middle of the 1930s, consumers had become so noise conscious that lower-priced cars had the same "noise characteristics of the heavier, expensive car." Absorption materials filtered high-pitched noises out, thus giving these lighter cars a "heavier feel."
48 By then, studies of noise had effectively abated disagreeable sounds to such a degree that some engineers feared it might jeopardize safety, since motorists "unconsciously run faster until the increased speed of the car reaches the noise level to which [they] are accustomed. . . . Noise reduction," the engineers concluded at a noise symposium, "tends to reduce the feeling of vibration, even though the vibration itself has not been reduced." 49 It was the new type of smooth roads that allowed this increased speed: a new type of high-speed, long-range motoring was emerging.
Co-constructing Tire Comfort
The next case of co-construction of car comfort involved powerful suppliers, tire manufacturers, who strengthened the position of drivers vis-à-vis the car manufacturers. Tire manufacturers had noticed during the early 1920s that customers deliberately underinflated tires so as to obtain a more comfortable ride as car speeds gradually increased, consciously accepting the rising costs of tire wear by doing so.
50 Suppliers like Goodyear developed balloon tires with a stronger carcass, enabling lower air pressure so that the tire could take up more of the springing work of the total wheel suspension. The automotive engineers fiercely opposed this innovation because they soon found that such tires would increase the danger of shimmy-a heavy vibration of the wheel around its steering pivot-which, apart from increasing the noise level of the vehicle, endangered steering and driving stability. It was dreaded as a "pernicious malady of mystery which is defying the cunning of near all car engineers."
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Within two years almost all users had changed to the new tire type, thus forcing the car manufacturers to commence scientific research on the elusive phenomenon of "ride comfort." The new properties of the tire necessitated changes in adjacent components, including the complete redesign of the suspension system, a process that took nearly two decades in an atmosphere of utmost uncertainty. One of the initial common solutions was a slight increase in tire pressure, but a decade later the "pernicious malady" recurred when "super balloon tires" appeared on the market, which consumers immediately embraced. 52 In the end, the research resulted in the insight that only independent front-wheel suspension (by which the front wheels were not interconnected by a common axle or leaf spring) could remedy the shimmy phenomenon. 53 This case also illustrated that the engineering community was not a 54. "Impressions That Are An Insult," 392 (for Horning's full text, see Horning, "Riding-Qualities That Are Physical and Mental Insults"); S. P. Hess, "Automobile Riding-Comfort" (no. 1), 82, and (no. 6), 543; H. L. Horning, "Bearing of Research Department Work on Car Developments," 190; "Riding-Qualities Research"; "Riding-Comfort Investigations." monolithic entity (nor was the expanding group of consumers), but instead consisted of factions, schools (often associated with individual car manufacturers), and leading individuals who managed to convince their colleagues of the necessity of, and approach to, solving the problem. The role of SAE in this negotiation and translation process was often one of fostering compromise between opposing interests and initiating research in fields that were either too difficult to manage by one single firm or too far removed from the production process. The noise-abatement campaign was just such a field, which soon expanded into an entirely new sector of research aimed at improving comfort and covering the gamut of what a body experiences while driving. Some veteran engineering authorities protested that what customers really wanted was not the "very monotonous [and] extreme boredom [of] an absolutely smooth road," even if such customers themselves would describe this situation as ideal: instead, they wanted a "heroic" vibration of the engine that "gave the impression of high speed." But most of their colleagues agreed to engage in a project of which the outcome was uncertain, but that was clearly directed at redefining and further easing the automotive adventure, especially its acoustic and vibrational aspects.
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Realizing that the U.S. car industry had "no satisfactory yardstick to measure riding-comfort," but that "vibrations . . . are by far the greatest annoyance in a car," SAE itself took the initiative in 1925 by approaching psychology professor Fred Moss of George Washington University in Washington, D.C., and setting up a Riding-Comfort Research Subcommittee. It developed a "wabble-meter" that could measure fatigue as an indicator of the much more elusive concept of comfort. Comfort, then, was defined as lack of fatigue and situated within a multi-sensorial view of the driving experience. By testing live human beings on a specially prepared "vibrating chair," the body became a seismograph.
Later, Ammon Swope of Purdue University expanded this research by subjecting 135 men and women (mostly students) to tests in order to measure "sensory qualities," such as motion, sound, sight, smell, and spatial relations and aesthetics, against the background of a number of characteristics, such as speed, noise from brakes, desirable amount of visibility, leg room, and the kind of floor covering. Swope distinguished between the responses by gender. For instance, women found skidding more objectionable, while engine noise appeared to be disagreeable to both. The feeling of acceleration also varied by gender. Not surprisingly, whether male or female, motorists preferred closed cars to open ones. 55 Comfort, one engineer now said, was a "state of mind" influenced by "mysterious rattles, squeaks and grunts."
56 And yet, eight years after the problem was first identified, when Moss presented his final report, there was still widespread uncertainty among engineers about what defined "a good ride." 57 At Purdue University, research continued on a new "shake table" that measured the physical responses of a hundred women, resulting in the conclusion that vertical vibrations were more easily endured than lateral ones.
58 When, by 1935, Chrysler stepped in to perform applied research for production, it developed simpler measuring instruments, such as the accelerometer invented by a Chrysler research engineer, C. A. Tea. In the process, new engineering concepts-for example, roadability and harshness-were coined, and a specialized "riding engineer" was added to SAE ranks to investigate the problems. 
Co-constructing the Closed Body
Just as with the adoption of the balloon tire, motorists themselves initiated the change to the closed body (which, according to some, was "the last major improvement of the automobile as a personal passenger vehicle") during the 1910s by using soft "tops"-often makeshift winter tops with emergency curtains and celluloid windows-to place on their open cars, thus allowing year-round motoring. 60 The Hudson Car Company was the first to recognize this trend and developed, in 1919, together with the Fisher Body Company, the all-steel, closed-bodied Essex. By 1924, both Chrysler and Dodge (the latter's bodies made by the Edward G. Budd Manufacturing Company) followed Hudson's example, and when, after 1925, a wave of closed models hit the market, they were mostly priced the same as the open versions, with astonishing results. After 60 percent of respondents in the eastern states and 40 percent in the southern states to the previously mentioned NACC survey indicated that their next purchase would be a closed car (citing weather, general comfort, year-round use, and better appearance as their motives), sales of closed cars explodedfirst in the more expensive price class, then, and most spectacularly, in the medium and lower segments. By the end of the decade, nearly all passenger-car production was of the closed variety, a body style known as the "sedan" (and, in the UK, "saloon"). 61 This change also decreased the interior size: while previously most cars traditionally came with seven passenger seats, now the norm became five or even four, aimed at the average U.S. family size. 62 The introduction of the closed body had an enormous impact on automotive technology, as well as its production and user culture; a British journal spoke of "almost a new motoring." 63 At first, the immediate ("depressing," one engineer opined later) effect on the driver was a decrease in visibility because the metal roof and small windows, which in cold weather were misted by the poor interior ventilation, blocked the motorist's vision. Although throughout the decade the engineers successfully wrangled with their sales departments to gradually increase the vehicle's glass surfaces and added ventilation and heating systems as well, soon a more expensive convertible version was introduced that, by the beginning of the 1930s, was in particular demand in the more variable climate in New England and the Midwest rather than in the South and the Pacific Coast region. 64 Around the same time, the engineers complained that the new, mass-produced seats were often less comfortable than the former ones in open-body vehicles. 65 The nearly 40 percent weight increase in smaller cars also necessitated a further increase in engine power to propel the heavier load. 66 Although the purpose of closing the vehicle was to isolate the human body from the environment, thus enabling a year-round user culture, the Only upon the insistence of maneffect on the senses was unintended and needed to be remedied. One problem was that the body panels caused new noise: as "sounding boards," they amplified the vibrations from the propulsion system and other chassis subsystems, as well as from the road, while windows rattled in doors and panels squeaked when moving relative to one another, emitting the notorious "drumming"-a resonance phenomenon.
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Such problems rendered acoustic engineering into one of the essential elements of the riding-comfort process, a decade-long effort to translate motorists' experiences into a viable vehicle design. Visibility was part of comfort as well; the engineers also focused their attention on designing a side-post that not only allowed unobstructed vision, but "yet will not look very light."
68 Even the sound of shutting the door was an object of study, as potential buyers preferred a soft rather than tinny sound.
69 After a decade of research and practical experience, body panels were coated with materials (often asphalt) to deaden noise as a matter of routine, while components were increasingly rubber-mounted, including the engine and transmission and the car body itself on its chassis.
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A gradual shift from technology to appearance and aesthetics in both the industry's marketing and buyers' preferences accompanied the closing of the body. By the end of the decade, when the body had slowly been rendered rattle-and leak-proof, appearance had advanced before comfort in perceived consumer desires, followed then by performance, reliability, value, and durability. The closing of the car body was not solely responsible for this trend; one slogan for open-bodied cars proclaimed: "The Body Sells the Car." But aesthetics did have consequences for engineering: the box-like, rather static appearance of the closed body in an increasingly high-speed traffic flow posed extra challenges to body designers.
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While the classic chassis engineers (especially the engineers who designed the engine and transmission) remained skeptical, new body engineers tried to reconcile the wish for comfort (which, tellingly, was initially compared to that of a quiet streetcar or train) with the increasing complexity of the car. 72 In other words, the closed body definitively made the car into a consumer product influenced by fashion, and, in general, a curious mix of engineering rationality and the creativity of the artist-designer. 73 The growing significance of the body engineer as a distinct specialist is apparent in the proceedings of the annual SAE meetings. While SAE organized its first session on the body in 1914, a separate division, as part of the Detroit Section, was only founded in 1928. 74 One of the new engineering tasks was to accede to the constant pressure from the sales department to further lower the body and still make it appear to be speedy even if it sat at curb level. 75 By the beginning of the 1930s, body engineers had started to conceptualize unit constructions, making a separate chassis superfluous (again, with the streetcar as an example) and consequently using 15 percent less steel, allowing the body to be lowered even more and be given a streamlined shape (for example, rounded corners and slanted windshield) for the automobile's new use in long-range touring. Moreover, specially designed coloring of the body enhanced the appearance of speed. 76 However, wind resistance resulting from the higher speeds introduced a new source of noise, while the sound of the tires also became noticeable as if to compensate for the decreasing engine sounds. Each technical refinement created a new noise issue: the engineers seemed to be heading toward an insurmountable noise barrier. This became all the more acute when, at the end of the 1920s, car radio made a rapid appearance. This much was clear: Americans were equipping themselves to go on long family tours in car interiors that, in 1937, still showed a sound and noise level of 82 decibels (dB) at 60 mph (which was 2 dB more than a large orchestra).
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By the end of the 1930s, the leaders of SAE noticed that appearance was so important to car owners that they "will accept a certain degree of discomfort." 78 Noise abatement and sound engineering, meanwhile, had developed so far that engineers openly started to conceptualize an "ideal car [that] should rapidly traverse an ordinary road in such a manner that the only indication of motion would be the sight of the passing landscape." Thinking from the point of view of the driver, engineers had been trying to eliminate sound to enable vision: shakes and harshness had been smoothed out enough to engender the idea of driving as "flight"-a fantasy of the driving experience during the previous forty years. With all bumpy motor-79. On the experience of flight by early motorists, see Mom, The Electric Vehicle, 38. 80. Michael Bull, "Soundscapes of the Car." ing engineered away and acceleration issues resolved, the automotive capsule could now be displayed as a rolling advertisement for itself.
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Conclusion
This analysis of nearly a quarter-century of the co-construction of technical properties and user-culture argues that the tourism wave did not alter the main impulse behind general automotive engineering-namely, to preserve at all costs the ideal of the automobile as both city car and touring car. Automotive engineers were not interested in developing a car exclusively for touring: instead, by carefully designing its properties, they introduced the touring function without jeopardizing the automobile's more general function. The dual-purposed family touring car resolved these contradictory preferences.
A critical element of this touring car was its sensorial characteristics, which emerged as a result of a complex engineering effort constrained, in part, by sales managers and car owners. This engineering effort took into account perceived though abstract customer wishes, such as the desire for comfort and performance. At the same time, engineers maintained and defended their own general principles, such as resisting alternative types of engines and limiting increasing costs, which could drive them out of business. In this restricted sense, the engineers indeed "gave the public what it wanted"; the constant focus on comfort led to an increasingly softer ride, hence liberating the senses for the visual. This means that in the design of technical properties, although customers' influence was often indirect, it was nevertheless real. Users were increasingly enclosed in a capsule in which the sounds were consciously changed, such that the acoustic feel of the exterior was softened, even decoupled from the interior. Comfort was defined as smoothness, perfect flight, and, ultimately, a dampening of the automotive adventure-without, however, giving it up entirely, as many thought had happened in the case of the electric car. Riders experienced comfort in a closed automobile, hence leisure; fatigue was identified with work in an American culture that maintained a strict separation between work and leisure. To the American way of thinking, the alternative approach of the European sporting-car culture was viewed as backward. 80 U.S. automotive engineering ended up featuring vision instead of sound as the dominant sense for touring. Although initially the visual field of closed cars was secondary because the windows were small, gradually the problems of noise and vibration (testifying to the principal synesthetic character of vision, hearing, and touch), as well as the later addition of the car radio, fostered noise-abatement and riding-comfort engineering that pro-
